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Abstract
When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the world,
optimal incentive schemes to control environmental problems may not always
satisfy the revelation principle. As a result, in equilibrium some agents may
send false messages, particularly when the information rents in the truth-
telling scheme are high. I characterise optimal pollution regulation schemes
and produce some numerical examples to show mechanisms which allow some
dishonesty in equilibrium may frequently outperform truth-telling schemes.
Keywords: D82; Q58; H23, optimal incentives, hiding, pollution, adverse
selection
1. Introduction.
When the set of possible messages depends on the actual state of the
world, optimal incentive schemes may not always satisfy the well-known rev-
elation principle. In a literature that has received intermittent attention,
several authors have already shown that the principle need not apply when
the feasible message space (e.g. statements about costs) depends on the state
of the world or agent type (e.g. actual costs) ( Lacker and Weinberg (1989)
Green and Laffont (1986) or Postlewaite (1979)). Instead it may be a feature
of the optimal scheme that some types of agents lie about their true nature.
These concepts have been applied sporadically in the theoretical literature on
industrial regulation (e.g. Singh and Wittman (2001) or Celik (2006)), but
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not so far to environmental issues.1 In fact though individuals, farmers and
businesses often face restrictions on their ability to misrepresent themselves
to experienced regulators (Wunder et al. (2008)). A rancher who owns a
section of steep and unploughable mountainside may not be able to credibly
pretend that all of it could be used for pasture or arable land. A firm with
a gleaming chimney and a recently installed processing unit bought from a
well-known supplier to the industry may not be able to disguise the fact that
abatement costs are lower than for its ageing competitors. In both cases,
regulators may still not have full information: the rancher may have neigh-
bours who have managed to turn some of their less severe slopes into grazing
land; there may be another firm that installed a slightly older generation of
technology only a few years previously. Thus there is neither full information
on the part of the regulator or complete freedom for the agent to choose the
message it sends. In such a context it seems reasonable to explore the im-
plications for optimal incentive mechanisms when the regulated agents face
some restrictions on the set of messages about their types that they are able
to send. That is the purpose and contribution of this paper.
Taking its cue from the mechanism design literature (e.g. Lacker and
Weinberg (1989)), the general lesson is that dishonesty for at least certain
types may be ex-ante Pareto efficient. The main reason is that in order
to create incentives for truth-telling, regulators have to allocate information
rents to those agents who are blessed with low costs or some other favourable,
but hidden feature of their choice environment. When these rents are suffi-
ciently high it may be welfare enhancing to have a mechanism that allows
some types to lie while others are induced to report their type truthfully. Of
course, theory abounds with special cases which have no empirical relevance,
but I also show that the conditions under which dishonesty is optimal are
not particularly unusual and match the sort of situation in which the ideas
of optimal regulation are typically applied.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section I provide some
motivating background. In sections 3 and 4 a simple model is introduced in
which there is a benign principal and a set of possible types of agents who
have private information about their type. To keep the paper straightforward
1Bontems et al. (2005) note in passing that the assumption of independence of the
feasible message set and the agent’s type and state ‘this assumption can be relaxed but at
a cost of much greater complexity for the analysis’ (footnote 3).
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I use a simple model with three types that is closely related to standard mod-
els used in both the pollution control and conservation literatures. Section 5
provides some numerical examples and section 6 concludes.
2. The Feasibility of Messages.
In pollution control, the regulatory authority is usually faced with a prob-
lem of asymmetric information. Firms may know more about their produc-
tivity, production costs and the costs of pollution control compared to the
regulator Spulber (1988), Moxey et al. (1999), Jebjerg and Lando (1997).
At the same time, consumers may be more informed about the benefits of
pollution control. In a similar manner, in conservation policies, suppliers
of conservation may be more informed about their costs of supply, Ferraro
(2008), Chambers (2002). In both these situation, in the standard approach,
a benign regulator sets out an incentive scheme or mechanism. In the scheme
firms announce their cost of reducing emissions or supplying conservation
services and receive incentives on that basis. In real examples of pollution
control, firms may find it hard to overstate or understate the costs of cutting
emissions for a number of reasons. Reporting higher costs than the true level
may mean that profits do not match reported costs. And while there may be
some scope for hiding extra earnings, when the degree of exaggeration is high,
the truth may be obvious to the authorities. At the same time some features
of the technology may be easily observable by the regulator who may then be
able to generate a plausible range of cost functions for the firm. Du and Mao
(2015) for example finds that age and installed capacity are highly predictive
for the marginal CO2 abatement cost amongst Chinese coal-burning power
stations. Firms may also face limitations on their ability to report costs lower
than the truth for similar reasons: profits and technology may send out clues
that are informative.
In the context of conservation, misrepresenting cost-relevant information
may be difficult if doing so would be associated with large and observable
differences in reported income or if there are clues, from soil, landscape type
and so on that provide a clear range to the regulator for possible costs of
compliance. Ferraro (2008) calls these clues, ‘costly to fake’ but acknowl-
edges that suppliers of conservation services may still have some ability to
hide or manipulate signals about compliance costs to their own advantage.
In the context of payments for watershed management in Mexico Mun˜oz-
Pin˜a et al. (2008) notes how econometric models were able to reduce the
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range of possible opportunity costs of compliance but not eliminate all un-
certainty. Meanwhile Dobbs and Pretty (2008) reports that payments for
environmentally sensitive management of farms in the U.K. allow some room
for negotiation over costs, but benchmarking costs at the regional level means
that there are effective limits on how farms may misrepresent their costs.
In both settings therefore, it can be possible for agents to physically
send all kinds of messages, but some will have no chance of being believable
to regulators.2 Faced with this and the extreme sanctions that might be
received for offering obvious lies, agents may consider that the set of feasible
messages in limited and depends in part on their true type. Now, a game
in which agents can send any message within a certain set, but cannot send
a believable message outside that set represents one simple way of modeling
restrictions on messages. However, there are other approaches: for instance
agents may be able to send any message but ex-post regulators may be able
to, at some cost, verify some aspects of a message. For example if a polluter
reports that its costs of abatement are $100 per tonne, a regulator may be
able through site inspection to identify some range of possible costs. If $100
lies outside this range and the firm faces a subsequent penalty for lying,
it would prefer to send a message within the range. This type of partial
verification in an abstract principal agent model is analyzed in Kartik (2009)
who has a model in which verification costs are non-zero but it may still be
optimal to lie. Alternatively, instead of costly verification for the regulator
it may be costly for the agent to lie (see Munro (2014) for a discussion of
this in the context of intra-household income hiding). For instance, a firm
that mispresents its costs may as a result make higher profits. Hiding these
profits, perhaps through unproductive investments or payment of rents to
management may be costly. If the costs of lying are increasing and convex in
the amount of misrepresentation then it may not be economic for the agent
to consider all possible messages. Thus, the model I use here is not the
only alternative to the standard case where the feasible message set is the
same for all types of agents. Nevertheless it seems a useful starting point to
understand why the revelation principal may not always be a part of optimal
2As Green and Laffont (1986) put it, ‘Whether the variation of the message space with
the true observation is purely technological, or whether it is induced by the severity of
potential actions of the principal, is largely a matter of interpretation. The important part
is that the implementability of any collective decision rule is determined by the interaction
of the allowable messages and the associated actions.’ p.447-448.
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environmental regulation.
3. A Basic Model of Efficient Hiding.
In this section, I propose a simple model in which lying about costs can
be part of an efficient contract for environmental regulation. I present this
as a model of abatement of a polluting activity. In particular it is a discrete
version of the model in Jebjerg and Lando (1997) (see also Spulber (1988),
Moxey et al. (1999)), but following Mason and Plantinga (2013) and Fer-
raro (2008) or Sipila¨inen and Huhtala (2012), we could also frame this as a
problem in conservation in a way that is mathematically equivalent.
There is a constant social marginal value of abatement, p. The profit-
maximizing suppliers of abatement, x, (which is observable) supply it at a
cost c(x, θ) where c is strictly increasing, twice differentiable and strictly
convex with c(0, θ) = 0.3 The parameter θ ∈ {θ1, ..., θn} ≡ Θ represents
a factor that affects the cost of abatement and which is private knowledge,
with θi > θi+1 i = 1, ..., n−1. In other words, lower values of i are associated
with higher costs and marginal costs for supplying abatement.4 Suppliers
differ only in this parameter and the probability distribution of types, pii is
common knowledge.
Let Θi be the set of feasible messages for type i. I shall always suppose
that θi ∈ Θi - in other words it is always feasible for any type to report
truthfully. In the standard case, Θi = Θ i = 1, ..., n. That is the message
space is independent of type and equal to the set of possible types. If Θj ⊆ Θi
whenever θj ∈ Θi then the message sets are said to be nested.5 Nesting might
mean that a higher type can always send the message sent by a lower type
or in the reverse version, the lower type can always send a message that it
is feasible for the higher type to send. For instance, it may be possible for
firms to always inflate their costs (e.g. by wasteful production).
3Although I don’t explicitly model it, c(.) can be thought of as the difference between
profits with and without an abatement requirement of x.
4For simplicity and to match the numerical examples later in the paper, I use a discrete
rather than continuous form model of θ.
5One feature of this condition worth noting is that it says nothing about whether all
message sets are nested. So for instance if firms in one province cannot signal a type from
a neighbouring province, the nested condition can still be satisfied if all message sets are
nested within each region.
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The regulator offers a menu of contracts, h : Θ→ R2 of the form, h(θi) =
(T (θi), x(θi)) where T (θi) is the transfer that will made to a firm that must
supply x(θi) units of abatement after it sends a message that its type is
θi. Transfers must be funded from public accounts and there is a marginal
efficiency cost of µ− 1 where µ > 1, meaning that there is some deadweight
cost from raising public funds.
The game form is as follows: First the regulator announces the menu of
contracts, the supplier observes its type, then sends a message about type
and then the contract is implemented according to the message.
Given this game form and the goal of profit-maximization, firms choose a
messagem(θi, h) ∈ Θi such that, −c(x(m(θi, h)), θi)+T (m(θi, h)) ≥ −c(x(θ), θi)+
T (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θi.
An outcome function, f(.), f : Θ→ R2, is said to be implementable if and
only if there exists a menu h(.) such that for all θ ∈ Θ, f(m(θi, h)) = f(θ).
It is said to be truthfully implementable if it is implementable and for all i,
m(θi, h) = θi . It is said to be dishonestly implementable if it is implementable
but for any menu that implements the outcome function, there is at least one
i such that m(θi, h) 6= θi .
Denote the value of x and T assigned to type in the outcome function
f(.) using subscripts - that is by xi and Ti. A benign regulator chooses the
menu of contracts, h, to maximize expected surplus or
W =
i=n∑
i=1
pii [pxi − c(xi, θi)− (µ− 1)Ti] (1)
subject to the constraints posed by the profit-maximizing behaviour of the
suppliers. The result is the optimum. A truthful equilibrium is the menu and
consequent outcome function that maximizes (1) subject to the constraints
posed by profit maximizing behaviour of the suppliers and with the additional
requirement that the outcome function be truthfully implementable. Con-
versely a dishonest equilibrium is one in which for the menu that implements
the outcome function, there is at least one i such that m(θi, h) 6= θi.
3.1. Nested messages sets.
Where there is one sided asymmetric information a sufficient condition
for truth-telling to be a feature of the optimum is nesting. In fact the re-
sult is more general: any outcome that can be feasibly implemented can be
truthfully implemented. (Green and Laffont (1986)).
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Proposition 1. (Green and Laffont (1986)). Suppose message sets are
nested. Then the set of implementable outcome functions is equivalent to
the set of truthfully-implementable outcome functions.
Proof. Let h(.) implement f(.) and suppose that h∗(.) defined by h∗(.) = f(.)
is not truthfully implementable. Since h∗ is not truthfully implementable,
there must be some θi such that h
∗(θi) = f(θj) j 6= i that is −c(xi, θi) +Ti <
−c(xj, θi) + Tj for some θj ∈ Θi. Since message sets are nested then if
θj ∈ Θi, Θj ∈ Θi. Since h implements f, then there can be no θ ∈ Θi such
that h(θ) = (Tj, xj) for if there were, then the θi type would prefer to send
the message θ since this produces higher profits. But since Θj ∈ Θi then this
also means that there is no feasible message the θj type can send such that
h(θj) = (Tj, xj) . Hence h() does not implement f() - a contradiction.
3.2. Standard case.
For this case, the revelation principle applies and there exists an optimal
mechanism in which each type sends a message that is truthful. For this
problem the constraints posed by rational behaviour by the suppliers take two
forms: first suppliers can always opt out of the programme, for instance by
closing down. This individual rationality (IR) constraint requires that profits
are non-negative for all participating suppliers. Secondly, each supplier must
prefer its own chosen contract over all other contracts. These are the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints and there are (n−1) of them for each supplier
type. Formally the two types of constraint are as follows:
Ti − c(xi, θi) ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., n (IR) (2)
T i − c(xi, θi) ≥ T j − c(xj, θi) i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ...n (IC) (3)
As is well known, these n2 constraints can be reduced to n binding restrictions
given the form of the cost function and the regulator’s maximand. First, we
note that if the IR constraint is satisfied by the supplier with the lowest
value of θ, then by the IC constraints it is also satisfied by the other supplier
types. That is, T 1 − c(x1, θ1) ≥ 0 implies T 1 − c(x1, θi) > 0 for i > 1 and
since Ti − c(xi, θi) ≥ T 1 − c(x1, θi) then T i − c(xi, θi) > 0 i > 1. In fact,
since the maximand is strictly decreasing in T, then the IR constraint will
be binding for the i = 1 type.
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Meanwhile, the relevant IC constraints are:
T i − c(xi, θi) ≥ T i−1 − c(xi−1, θi) i = 2, ..., n; (IC ′) (4)
To see this, consider a situation where type i is indifferent between its own
contract and that taken by type i−1. In other words, T i− c(xi, θi) = T i−1−
c(xi−1, θi). By strict convexity, c(xi, θi−1)−c(xi, θi) > c(xi−1, θi−1)−c(xi−1, θi)
for xi > xi−1.6 Thus, T i − c(xi, θi−1) > T i−1 − c(xi−1, θi−1) . In short,
type (i-1) strictly prefers its own contract to that chosen by type i, so that
the IC constraint is only binding for the ‘downward’ constraint and not for
the ‘upward’ constraint for neighbouring types. The same convexity-based
argument can then be extended to types (i+ 1) and (i− 2) and by induction
to all supplier types. Moreover, all suppliers except the first type must have
at least one binding constraint because if a constraint was not binding, Ti
could be lowered in a way that did not break any incentives but at the same
time increased the expected payoff to the regulator. For the i = 1 type, it is
the IR constraint that binds.
The regulator therefore maximizes:
i=n∑
i=1
pii [pxi − c(xi, θi)− (µ− 1)Ti]
+
i=n∑
i=2
λi [T i − c(xi, θi)− T i−1 + c(xi−1, θi)] + λ1 [T 1 − c(x1, θ1)] (5)
From this we get the first order conditions:
pii [p− c′(xi, θi)]− λic′(xi, θi) + λi+1c′(xi, θi+1) = 0 i = 1, ...n− 1 (6)
pii [p− c′(xi, θi)]− λic′(xi, θi) = 0 i = n (7)
−pii(µ− 1) + λi − λi+1 = 0 i = 1, ..., n− 1 (8)
6That x is increasing in i comes from the cost function. A contract that offered a lower
value of x to a higher value of i could always be removed from the set of options to give
the regulator higher expected profits.
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−pii(µ− 1) + λi = 0 i = n (9)
From this we get that,
p− c′(xi, θi) = (µ− 1)
pii
[
c′(xi, θi)
j=n∑
j=i
pij − c′(xi, θi+1)
j=n∑
j=i+1
pij
]
i = 1, ...n− 1
(10)
p− c′(xi, θi) = (µ− 1)c′(xi, θi) i = n (11)
For the highest type therefore, the distortion between price and marginal
cost only reflects the marginal cost of public funds. For other types, the
distortion includes an added cost from asymmetric information.
3.3. Diagrammatic Illustration.
The equilibrium is illustrated for a three type case in Figure 1. Three iso-
profit curves, A, B and C are shown with A representing type1, B representing
type 2 and C representing type 3. The optimal allocations for the three types
are indicated by the lower case a, b and c. Through c there is a concave curve
that represents an iso-welfare curve. At the optimum type 3 is indifferent
between its own allocation at c and the allocation that is chosen by type
2, b. Similarly type 2 is indifferent between b and a. The iso-profit line
A represents zero profit for type 1 firms. Meanwhile at c, the absence of a
distortion at the equilibrium for the highest type is represented by the fact
that the iso-profit and iso-welfare curves are tangents.
3.4. Non-nested message sets.
Suppose there is at least one triple of agent types, i, j, k with i ≤ j ≤ k
such that not Θi ⊆ Θj and Θj ⊆ Θk then message sets cannot be nested.
To be specific, for the jth type let the set of feasible messages be Θj = {θ :
θj + δ ≥ θ ≥ θj} ∩ Θ with δ ≥ 07. In other words each type j can send a
message that it is type j or it can mimic any type that lies within the range
θj to θj +δ. If there are no such agents then the firm can only send a truthful
7For simplicity I set δ as independent of j, but in theory it could vary according to
type.
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Figure 1: A Truth-telling equilibrium.
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message, but if δ is sufficiently large then message sets are nested and the
revelation principle applies. Note that an agent with the highest possible θ
cannot therefore lie. With this formulation it is possible that the cardinality
of the message set will vary amongst types. As a empirical feature this seems
reasonable, but the sake of the model that follows I will make the further
assumption that δ and Θ are such that for all but highest possible θ, each
type can feasibly send two possible messages: one truthful and one in which
it imitates the next lowest type. This simplifies the analysis that follows but
is not essential to the argument.
Proposition 2. For any optimum allocation there is a mechanism in which
agents with the highest and lowest types report honestly.
Proof. By construction it is not possible for a player in the lowest type to be
dishonest. Suppose a highest type agent is dishonest about its type. Since no
other type can send a message that it is type n, then the message(s) associated
with the n-type are redundant. Replacing (Tn, xn, θn) with (Tn−1, xn−1, θn)
produces the same outcomes but without any misrepresentation.
Corollary 3. When there are at most two types of the world, then the opti-
mum is a truthful equilibrium.
4. An example with dishonesty.
Figure 2 provides some intuition about the value of allowing dishonesty to
the regulator. It shows the same payoff structure as in the previous figure but
it also shows a dishonest allocation which may ex ante dominate the honest
equilibrium. In this diagram A, B, C and a, b, c are as before. The dishonest
allocation is represented by a, b′ and c′. That is the allocation is unchanged
for the lowest type. (This allocation may therefore not represent the optimal
allocation with dishonesty. Nevertheless it is useful to fix a in order to focus
on the changes to the allocation to types 2 and 3.) The allocation b′ is
such that type 2 prefers to lie and pretend to be type 1 rather than take b′.
Conversely b′ is such that type 3 prefers to take c′ over b′. Notice that in this
diagram, type 3 would actually prefer to state that it is type 1, but because
this message is not feasible it takes c′. For the regulator the net benefits of
dishonest allocation depend on a comparison of a gain in welfare from moving
type 3 from c to c′ against the loss of welfare from moving type 2 from b to b′.
In fact in the diagram it appears that possibly the loss outweighs the gains,
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with Dishonesty
but if say, a was closer to b, then the net benefit would be possible. Could
the same outcome be achieved by offering an allocation in which players tell
the truth? Fixing a and c′, any b′ that is preferred by type 2 to a must also
be preferred by type 3 to c′. In other words it is not possible to support the
allocation of a to types 1 and 2 and c′ to type 3 through truth-telling.
The diagram is suggestive, but not conclusive. I now present an extended
example to show that dishonesty may be optimal. Specifically, I use the cost
function, c = θi(xi+1)
2
2
− θi
2
and also to make the example clearer, I select p
12
is such that x1 > 0 so that abatement is strictly positive for all types.
8. In
other words, θ1 < p/µ. The planner aims to maximize,
W =
i=3∑
i=1
pii
(
pxi − θi
2
(xi + 1)
2 +
θi
2
− (µ− 1)Ti
)
(12)
The relevant cases are as follows:
4.1. Full information case.
For this case, the Lagrangean is,
W + λ1
(
θ1
2
(
1− (x1 + 1)2
)
+ T1
)
+ λ2
(
θ2
2
(
1− (x2 + 1)2
)
+ T2
)
+ λ3
(
θ3
2
(
1− (x3 + 1)2
)
+ T3
)
(13)
The constraints here are the participation constraints for the three types.We
get the following solution for abatement:
xi =
p
µθi
− 1 (14)
Ti =
θi
2
(
p2
µ2θ2i
− 1
)
4.2. The truth-telling equilibrium
In this case the Lagrangean is
W + λ
(
θ1
2
(
1− (x1 + 1)2
)
+ T1
)
+ γ2
(
−θ2
2
(x2 + 1)
2 +
θ2
2
(x1 + 1)
2 + T2 − T1
)
+ γ3
(
−θ3
2
(x3 + 1)
2 +
θ3
2
(x2 + 1)
2 + T3 − T2
)
(15)
8In addition to make the problem well-behaved I impose:
∑j=3
j=i θipij >
∑j=3
j=i+1 θi+1pij
13
The constraints represent a participation constraint for type 1 firm and
incentive compatibility constraints for the other two types. The first order
conditions for an interior solution are,
pi1 (p− θ1(x1 + 1))− λθ1(x1 + 1) + γ2θ2(x1 + 1) = 0 (16a)
−pi1(µ− 1) + λ− γ2 = 0
pi2 (p− θ2(x2 + 1))− γ2θ2(x2 + 1) + γ3θ3(x2 + 1) = 0
−pi2(µ− 1) + γ2 − γ3 = 0
pi3 (p− θ3(x3 + 1))− γ3θ3(x3 + 1) = 0
−pi3(µ− 1) + γ3 = 0
The solution for abatement (but not the associated payment) by the third
type is unchanged from the full information case. For the other types we get:
x2 =
pi2p
pi2µθ2 + pi3 (µ− 1) [θ2 − θ3] − 1 (17)
x1 =
pi1p
pi1θ1 + (µ− 1) [θ1 − (1− pi1)θ2] − 1 (18)
Meanwhile,
T1 =
θ1
2
[
(x1 + 1)
2 − 1]
T2 =
θ2
2
[
(x2 + 1)
2 − 1]+ T1 [1− θ2
θ1
]
T3 =
θ3
2
[
(x3 + 1)
2 − 1]+ T2 [1− θ3
θ2
]
− θ3
θ2
T1
[
1− θ2
θ1
]
From these we get,
Proposition 4. In the truth-telling equilibrium, Ti and xi are increasing in
p, decreasing in µ and θi and increasing in pii for i = 1, 2. x3 is increasing
in p, decreasing in µ and θ3 and Ti is increasing in p and decreasing in µ.
Proof. By partial differentiation of the preceding equations and equation (14)
for x3.
14
4.3. The dishonest equilibrium.
Since type 2 will not choose their own bundle, it can be designed in
a way that makes type 3 indifferent between participation and opting out.
Similarly the bundle aimed at types 1 and 2 (labeled here as ‘1’) is chosen
subject to the condition that type 1 participates. As a result the problem
can be represented by the Lagrangean
W + λ1
(
θ1
2
(
1− (x1 + 1)2
)
+ T1
)
+ λ3
(
θ3
2
(
1− (x3 + 1)2
)
+ T3
)
(19)
The first order conditions for an interior solution are,
pi1 (p− θ1(x1 + 1)) + pi2 (p− θ2(x1 + 1))− λ1θ1(x1 + 1) = 0 (20a)
− (pi1 + pi2) (µ− 1) + λ1 = 0
pi3 (p− θ3(x3 + 1))− λ3θ(x3 + 1) = 0
−pi3(µ− 1) + λ3 = 0
The solution for abatement by the third type is again unchanged from
the full information case. Using ‘d’ to indicate the dishonest equilibrium, for
the other two types, the solution is,
xd1 = x
d
2 =
p(pi1 + pi2)
µpi1θ1 + pi2 [θ2 + (µ− 1) θ1] − 1 (21)
In this situation, transfers are:
T d2 = T
d
1 =
θ1
2
[(
xd1 + 1
)2 − 1]
T d3 =
θ3
2
[(
p
µθ3
)2
− 1
]
From these we get,
Proposition 5. In the dishonest equilibrium, T di and x
d
i are increasing in p,
decreasing in µ and increasing in pii for i = 1, 2. T
d
i and x
d
i are increasing in
p, decreasing in µ and θ3.
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Proof. By partial differentiation of the preceding equations and equation (14)
for x3.
The net gain from dishonesty rather than truth-telling is,
∆W = W d −W = pi1
(
p
(
xd1 − x1
)
+ µ
(
T1 − T d1
))
+ pi2
(
p
(
xd1 − x2
)
+ µ
(
T2 − T d1
)− T1 [1− θ2
θ1
])
+ pi3
(
(µ− 1) (T3 − T d3 )) (22)
Proposition 6. The net gain to dishonesty is increasing in pi3 and decreasing
in θ3.
Proof. By partial differentiation of equation (22) (see Appendix for details).
The key point here is that the second type has to be relatively rare com-
pared to type 3 in order for dishonesty to be optimal. The reason is that the
ability to mimic type 2 gives type 3 informational rents in the truth-telling
equilibrium. Removing this ability by encouraging type 2 to mimic type 1’s
bundle and offering a bundle to type 2s that is unappealing removes these
informational rents but comes at a cost of also lowering abatement by type
2s. When type 2 is more prevalent this cost outweighs the value of the finan-
cial savings from moving to the dishonest equilibrium. On the other hand,
if type 2 is rare, the cost of the information rents paid out to type 3 can be
become large compared to the value of the abatement that is obtained from
type 2s at the truth-telling equilibrium.
4.4. n types.
A question is what happens if there are more than 3 types. Is it possible
for more than one type to be dishonest at an optimum for instance if n >
3? It is clear from the sections above that it is not possible to show that
in general a dishonest equilibrium yields higher welfare than the truthful
equilibrium, however it is possible to show that under certain conditions that
there exist implementable menus in which nearly all types send dishonest
messages and as the number of types increases, the difference in welfare
between the dishonest equilibrium and the full information outcome tends to
zero.
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To see this, I revert back to the general cost function, c(x, θ). Fix θ1 =
θ and fix θn = θ¯. Let θi =
(
i−1
n−1
)
θn +
(
n−i+1
n−1
)
θ1 and suppose that δ =
(θn − θ1) / (n− 1) thus Θj = {θj, θj−1} for j > 1 and Θ1 = {θ1}. Meanwhile
let pii = 1/n. Let W∗ =
∑
i piiw
∗
i where w
∗
i is the value of pxi − c(xi, θi) −
(µ− 1)Ti in the full information case. Let W d be the equivalent function for
the dishonest equilibrium.
Proposition 7. W ∗ −W d → 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Suppose that n > 3 and consider the following menu: h(θj) = (x
∗
j+1, T
∗
j+1)j =
3, .., n− 2; h(θn) = (x∗n, T ∗n) , h(θj) = (0, 0) j = n− 1, h(θ1) = (xd1, T d1 ) j = 1
where the superscript ∗ refers to the full-information case and d refers to the
dishonest equilibrium. Under this menu, the n-th type sends a truthful mes-
sage. Each of types j = 3 to n-1 sends a message that they are type j−1 and
in return gets the outcome for the jth type in the full-information case. The
j = 1 and j = 2 types both send the message that they are j=1 and in return
get (xd1, T
d
1 ). Type 1 has no choice about its message. For type j > 1 the
alternative feasible message either yields negative payoff (for j = 2 to n-1) or
0 (for j = n). It follows that h is implementable and it involves dishonesty,
but note that this is not necessarily the optimal dishonest menu. Thus, the
resulting value of W is such that W ≤ W d. W ∗ −W d ≤ 1
n
(
w∗1 + w
∗
2 − 2wd1
)
.
Since w∗j ≤ w∗j+1 j = 1, .., n (because if it was not then it would be feasi-
ble to replace h(θj+1) = (x
∗
j+1, T
∗
j+1) with h(θj+1) = (x
∗
j , T
∗
j ) and the result
would yield higher W) then W ∗ −W d ≤ 1
n
(
2w∗n − 2wd1
) ≤ 2
n
(w∗n). But since
w∗(θn) = w∗(θ¯) then 2n (w
∗
n)→ 0 as n→∞ and the result follows.
This result shows that when the number of types is sufficiently large,
a menu in which all but 2 types are dishonest can yield welfare that ap-
proximates the full-information outcome. The ‘trick’ is that the information
rent of the highest type is eliminated by making it unattractive to send an
untruthful message. For the other types (excluding the lowest), the full infor-
mation outcome is also implementable because the only alternative message
forces them to supply the abatement level of a higher type and since that
abatement level produced zero profits for the higher type, copying it would
produce losses. It’s clear therefore that this is a special case but if each type’s
message set included m other sequentially lower types then a menu in which
all but the bottom m+1 types abated at the full-information level would still
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be possible.9
5. Numerical Example.
The diagrams are suggestive but are not numerically exact. I now give
some specific numerical examples using the cost function of the previous
section. Of course, any numbers can be used to produce an existence result,
but I wish also to show that the examples are reasonable, in the sense that
the parameters are not out of line with those used in some of the literature
on abatement or conservation problems.
The key parameters are p, µ, pi and θ. Estimates for the marginal costs of
public funds (µ) vary somewhat but typically lie in the range 1−2.0 (Dahlby
(2008); Hansson and Stuart (1985); Snow and Warren (1996)). For marginal
benefits, p and marginal costs, θ, I draw on a variety of sources (e.g. Gray
and Shadbegian (2004) ) but set p large relative to marginal costs for the
purpose of having examples in which abatement is optimal. For example,
for the case of ecosystem service payments, Holmes et al. (2004) for instance
find a range of 4.03 to 15.65 for benefit to cost ratios for river restoration,
figures which are similar to earlier estimates from Loomis et al. (2000). The
ratio p/θ that I use in the examples is compatible with these estimates. In
fact the shapes of the curves in the figures are not sensitive to values of p
above 2. In terms of plausibility, the key difficulty is finding values for pi, so
I allow these parameters to vary in the first example below. In the second
example I use a specific paper to guide the estimates.
Figure 3 shows, ∆W , the net gain to dishonesty (vertical axis) against the
probability of type 2 (horizontal axis) for different values of the probability
of type 1. In this chart, p = 4, µ = 1.5 and θ = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2]. For these
values the net gain is decreasing in pi2 and pi1, but when the probability of
type 2 is sufficiently rare and the probability of type 3 is sufficiently high,
then the gains to dishonesty are positive. For the highest positive number in
the figure, the gain in welfare from switching to the dishonesty equilibrium
represents about 19% of the welfare from the full-information case.
Figure 4 shows how the advantage of the dishonest equilibrium changes
in response to variation in µ and θ2. For this example p = 4 , θ1 = 0.5, θ3 =
0.2, p1 = 0.3, p2 = 0.2. As θ2 tends to θ1 the advantage becomes positive
9If δ did not fall with n, then as n increases the cardinality of the message sets would
increase too and there is therefore no similar convergence result.
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Figure 3: ∆W for changes in pi2
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Figure 4: ∆W against changes in µ (horizontal axis) for different values of θ2.
and larger in absolute size since the rent that must be paid to type 3 in the
truth-telling equilibrium becomes large compared to the rent paid to type
2. At the same time, as the cost of public funds rises then the advantage
of the dishonest equilibrium rises, since this involves lower transfers to type
3. In the most extreme case shown, the gain in welfare from switching to
the dishonest equilibrium represents 65% of the welfare obtainable from the
full-information case. In other words, the standard, truth-telling incentive
mechanism is very inefficient.
5.1. Varying the size of the message set.
In this example, I consider a case where the spread of possible costs
varies and also the size of the message set varies according to the parameter
δ. Suppose for instance that θ follows a half-normal distribution where σ
is the standard deviation of the associated normal distribution. This could
arise when for example the distribution has been estimated using a stochastic
frontier approach as in Sheriff (2009) who derives the distribution of cost-
related types for a land set aside program in the mid-west of the USA. He
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estimates a half-normal distribution of cost parameters that cannot be related
to observable characteristics. Specifically, consider a case where θ3 is fixed at
0.2. Suppose θ2 and θ1 are defined such θ2 = 0.2 + 0.5σ and θ1 = 0.2 + σ. If
θ follows a half-normal distribution where σ is the standard deviation of the
associated normal distribution, then 0.38 of the distribution lies between θ1
and θ2 0.30 between θ2 and θ3 and 0.32 has a value more than θ1. Suppose
for simplicity that exactly all types have θ = θi. Table 1 shows the achievable
welfare as a fraction of the full information value, for different values of σ
and δ in these circumstances,10 with p = 4, µ = 1.5 . If δ is sufficiently
small, firms cannot falsify their own type. In this case, the full information
allocation is acheivable. Such cases are indicated by the green italicised font
in the table. For intermediate values of δ , Θi = {θi, θi−1} i > 1. In this case
the optimum is the dishonest allocation (font in bold black) and when δ is
sufficiently large, message sets are nested and the truth-telling equilibrium is
the optimum (font in blue, normal). As the message set expands so welfare
falls, as more information rents must be granted to lower cost abating firms
in order to induce their compliance. It can be seen that the welfare cost of
using a truthful mechanism can be substantial. In the case of σ = 0.3 for
example, welfare is reduced by 24.2% from the full information level if the
optimal truthful mechanism is used, but by only 4.5% if the best dishonest
scheme is used.
6. Conclusions.
In a world where regulators have some insight into the cost structures of
potential suppliers of environmental services, it may not be possible for all
types of supplier to send credible messages about all other possible types.
The possibility that feasible messages may be contingent on the true state
of the world implies that the revelation principle need not be a feature of
10In Sheriff (2009) the lowest cost type is normalized with θ = 1. His model is actually
for the inverse of my θ and he gets 0.861 for its standard deviation. Maintaining the same
coefficient of variation would produce a value for θ2 of roughly 0.35 - i.e. the same value
generated in my example by using σ = 0.3. However since his parameter is the inverse
of mine, θ1 would be significantly larger (around 1.4 for σ = 0.3) if I was to match this
part of the distribution. For the parameter values used to generate Table 1, this would
eliminate the truthful equilibrium as the optimum. While it would expand the range of
values for which the dishonest equilibrium was optimal the welfare cost of using the best
truthful mechanism relative to the dishonest equilibrium would decrease.
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σ
δ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.05 0.976 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.10 0.921 0.962 1.000 1.000
0.15 0.921 0.962 0.955 1.000
0.20 0.921 0.840 0.955 0.951
0.25 0.921 0.840 0.955 0.951
0.30 0.921 0.840 0.758 0.951
Table 1: Welfare as a Function of Message Set Size
optimal incentives for pollution control and conservation supply. Rather, in
some cases, the cost of getting suppliers to reveal their information may be
too high to justify truth-telling contracts. Instead, lying may be optimal
in equilibrium at least for some suppliers. Allowing some types to send
inaccurate messages means that the incentive compatibility constraints on
other types can be relaxed. I take a straightforward and well-known model
and show that for a variety of parameter values this is indeed the case.
Although the parameter values for the numerical examples are not closely
matched to any particular empirical example, it is notable that the cases in
which dishonesty is optimal are not pathological. In fact just the opposite.
The paper also has some implications for an empirical strategy that uses
the first-order conditions for a optimal mechanism to estimate a structural
model of the cost distribution for an industry supplying conservation or
abatement services (e.g. Lavergne and Thomas (2005) for water pollution
in France or Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) for energy inputs). One of the
identifying assumptions of the literature is that the mechanism is truthful.
In the case that the optimal mechanism is actually dishonest then the esti-
mates from the standard approach that assumes the revelation principle may
be biased.
A feature of the optimal dishonest contract is that it can be simpler than
the contract that induces truthful revelation in the sense that the number of
actively reported types is smaller. Thus allowing some dishonesty can be a
means for a regulator to raise welfare and simplify the incentive structure at
the same time.
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Appendix.
∂∆W
∂µ
=
p2pi3(µ− 1)(θ2/θ1 − 1)
θ1µ3
+
µp2(pi1 + pi2)
2(θ1pi1 + θ1pi2)
2
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)3
− pi1p
2/(θ1µ
2)
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)3 −
θ1p
2(pi1 + pi2)
3
2(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)2 − 1))
+pi1
[
p
(
ppi1(θ1 + θ2(pi1 − 1))
(θ1pi1 + (θ1 + θ2(pi1 − 1))(µ− 1))2
)]
− p
2(pi1 + pi2)
2(θ1pi1 + θ1pi2)
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)2
+
pi1θ1
2
(
p2
θ21µ
2
− 1
)
−
[
pi3
2
(
p2
θ21µ
2
− 1
)
(θ2 − θ1)
]
+ pi2p
2
[
pi2(θ2pi2 + pi3(θ2 − θ3))
(pi3(θ2 − θ3)(µ− 1) + θ2µpi2)2
]
+ µpi2
[
p2(θ2/θ1 − 1)
θ1µ3
− p
2
θ2µ3
]
+
pi2θ2
2
(
p2
θ22µ2
− 1
)
− pi2
[(
p2
θ21µ
2
− 1
)
(θ2 − θ1)
2
+
p2(θ2/θ1 − 1)
θ1µ3
]
(23)
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∂∆W
∂p
= − 2ppi
2
1
(θ1pi1 + (θ1 + θ2(pi1 − 1))(µ− 1)))
+ µ
(
p
(θ1µ2)
− θ1p(pi1 + pi2)
2
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)2
)
+
2p(pi1 + pi2)
2
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1) −
2ppi22
(pi3(θ2 − θ3)(µ− 1) + θ2µpi2)
− µ
(
p(θ2/θ1 − 1)
θ1µ2
− p
θ2µ2
+
θ1p(pi1 + pi2)
2
(pi2(θ2 + θ1(µ− 1)) + θ1µpi1)2
)
+
(p(θ2/θ1 − 1))
(θ1µ2)
)− ppi3(µ− 1)(θ2/θ1 − 1)
θ1µ2
(24)
∂∆W
∂θ3
= − p
2pi22pi3(µ− 1)
(pi3(θ2 − θ3)(µ− 1) + θ2µpi2)2 (25)
∂∆W
∂pi3
=
p2p22(θ2 − θ3)(µ− 1)
(pi3(θ2 − θ3)(µ− 1) + θ2µpi2)2 −
(θ2 − θ1)(µ− 1)
2
(
p2
θ21µ
2
− 1
)
(26)
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